Nomenclature
A final extension to the mission, the Solstice mission, is underway, with plans to continue 4 months beyond Saturn's Northern hemisphere summer solstice in May 2017. To ensure Cassini does not contaminate any of Saturn's moons, it will intentionally crash into Saturn -- 
III. Cassini Attitude Control Subsystem Fault Protection
Since Cassini operates far from Earth, where the one-way light time can be up 92 minutes, the Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS) flight software (FSW) makes use of an extensive suite of fault protection (FP), which was designed and included from the beginning as an integral part of the FSW, rather than an add-on. These fault protection algorithms perform autonomous detection, isolation, and recovery from failures of AACS assemblies and AACS-controlled propulsion units. The primary components of the fault protection software are: Error Monitors, which test performance measures against expectations, Activation Rules, which evaluate subsets of the error monitor outputs to make a diagnosis, Response Scripts, which are called on by activation rules to isolate failed equipment and recover a level of subsystem functionality, and Repair Managers, which track the success or failure of past corrective measures 2 . Cassini Fault protection error monitors deal with sun sensor health and mitigation. The sun sensors are considered a required resource for several critical AACS FSW modes, as at least one SSA is needed as a required resource to perform the sun search in response to a fault that causes the loss of celestial reference 3 . A credible example of such a fault, given the uncertainty of the atmospheric density of Saturn, would be a spacecraft tumbling scenario due to atmospheric torques overwhelming the control authority of the reaction control system thrusters.
IV. Potential Sun Sensor Loss Mitigation
Toward the end of the proximal orbits, Cassini will ambitiously fly, for the first time, very close to Saturn's inner D-ring, where damage due to solid particle hyper-velocity impacts may occur. The spacecraft will be pointed such that the High Gain Antenna (HGA) will face the incoming flow of particles, which will allow the HGA to act as a shield for the rest of the spacecraft ( Figure 5 ). The sun sensors, however, are exposed to the flow of particles, as they are co-located with the HGA (Figure 6 ). There are two redundant sun sensors, Sun Sensor Assembly A (SSA A) and Sun Sensor Assembly B (SSA B). They each contain two Sun Sensor Heads (SSH1 and SSH2), and the heads are mounted perpendicular to one another, with each SSA head mounted in the same housing. That is, SSA A head 1 is mounted with SSA B head 1, and SSA A head 2 is mounted with SSA B head 2, with only a thin alloy wall separating them ( Figure 7 ). The concern is that a Saturn ring particle, or set of particles, could impact either of the two head assemblies, thereby damaging both SSAs. An extensive statistical analysis was performed to show that this was unlikely 1 , but given the uncertainty of flying through a ring gap for the first time, the operations team has deemed it prudent to develop a plan to recover and operate the spacecraft in the face of a failure to both SSAs. The sun sensors are redundant, and the sun reference they provide is not used in nominal attitude estimation and control. If the FSW loses or intentionally drops attitude reference due to a fault, an SSA is needed to successfully navigate the Find_Sun and Center_Sun FSW modes, or else celestial attitude reference will not be attained, and the spacecraft may be lost.
Before the spacecraft passes through a ring plane gap considered potentially hazardous, the operations team plans to send a command that will explicitly disable all sun sensor related fault protection. This command, called the eclipse command, has two arguments: a start time, and an end time. This command is normally used when Cassini flies through Saturn's shadow, occulting the sun. The operations team has used this command many times for true occultations of the sun, but the team has taken advantage of this command during hazardous ring plane crossings, too. The eclipse command can be extended indefinitely, such that if needed, the sun sensor fault protection can be effectively disabled indefinitely, in the presence of both failed sun sensors. This is not enough protection, however, as other fault monitors, such as Excessive Attitude Error, also call responses that can drop attitude reference, so something needs to be done about them. To mitigate this risk, the operations team will send a patch to a flag that enables Deluxe Attitude Initialization, or Deluxe AI. This flag prevents all fault protection responses from dropping attitude reference, so that the sun search mode is never entered, which is exactly what is desired if both sun sensors have failed. For more information on the extensive testing and validation of the Deluxe Attitude Initialization, see reference 4.
V. Proximal Ring Plane Crossing Sun Sensor Management
The eclipse command disables 6 on-board sun sensor-related error monitors. However, if the prime SSA is degraded or damaged during a critical ring plane crossing, it might trigger one of these error monitors once the eclipse command expires. Therefore, a ground operator, rather than the on-board fault protection system, needs to have the first opportunity to diagnose and execute a contingency plan in the event of a SSA anomaly due to the critical ring plane crossing.
During proximal orbit ring plane crossings, the sun sensor risk management strategy is to power on the backup SSA and send an extended eclipse command before a critical ring plane crossing. The duration of the eclipse command should allow enough time after the critical ring plane crossing for an attitude control engineer to review SSArelated data, determine the health states of both sun sensors, and execute the appropriate response based on those health states, before the eclipse expires. For Cassini engineers to determine the health of the sun sensors, the ground team needs visibility of the sun passing through all four quadrants of the sun sensor field of view. Thus, the state of the positive and negative sides of each head can be confirmed and verified. This can be accomplished with what is known as a downlink roll. The Cassini High Gain Antenna (HGA) is pointed at Earth for telecommunications, and the spacecraft is rolled about the z-axis, which is essentially co-linear with the HGA. Since the sun is usually a few degrees away from the Earth from Cassini's point of view, this causes the sun to cone around all four quadrants of the sun sensor field of view, as shown in Figure 8 . 
Send Eclipse Command
The eclipse command is placed in a stored sequence to be issued well before the predicted start time of the critical ring plane crossing. The command should have a start time at least 30 minutes before the predicted start time of the ring plane crossing, and an end time that allows for at least 2 complete downlink passes after the ring plane crossing, that contain rolls of sufficient duration, with a sun cone angle of at least 2°. The downlink rolls with sufficient sun cone angle allow the sun to roll through all four quadrants of both SSAs, which allows the ground engineer to verify SSA health. Two passes are required for redundancy, in order to allow for possible ground station errors.
Power On Backup SSA
The backup SSA, normally powered off, is powered on before the ring plane crossing in order to assess its health following the ring plane crossing. This should be done in the beginning of the last downlink pass before the critical ring plans crossing. Cassini typically has one eight hour downlink pass every day, so powering on the backup SSA during the beginning of the downlink pass allows ground operators to confirm the power state of the backup SSA via telemetry.
Ring Plane Crossing
The Cassini spacecraft passes through Saturn's ring plane, with the High Gain antenna pointed in the direction of the oncoming ring dust particles. This protects the spacecraft, but exposes the SSAs to incoming particle collisions.
SSA Checkout
Rolls are performed about the Z axis on the first two downlink passes, such that the sun cones within the SSA field of view, allowing the health of both heads of the sun sensors to be verified. Usually these rolls are performed during downlink of telemetry, while the spacecraft is pointed at Earth. If the HGA to sun cone angle is not large enough to provide sufficient visibility of all four quadrants of the sun sensor field of view, the rolls are performed off Earth point. The sun position within the SSA field of view is compared with a prediction based on spacecraft ephemeris (See Figure 10) . If there is significant degradation in both SSAs, an additional eclipse command is sent to lengthen the time that the sun sensor fault monitors are masked, and the ground would initiate deluxe AI commanding, as described in reference 4. Deluxe AI mode effectively prevents all fault protection responses from dropping celestial attitude reference, thereby precluding transitions to sun search mode, which requires a healthy sun sensor for completion. If the prime sun sensor is degraded, but not the backup, a command to swap prime and backup designations in the flight software would be issued. If the backup sun sensor is degraded, but the prime sensor is healthy, no additional commanding is needed.
Power Off The Backup SSA
This command will be issued in the event nether, one SSA, or both SSAs are damaged. If the original prime SSA was damaged, a real time command would have been sent to swap prime and backup designations, so that by the time the backup is commanded off in the background sequence, the working SSA has been designated prime. If both SSAs were damaged, the deluxe AI commanding would have been sent, which would preclude the use of either SSA by the flight software from that point onward.
VI. Conclusion
The Cassini Proximal Orbit Saturn ring plane crossings present many challenges for the operations team to overcome, not the least of which is sun sensor protection and mitigation. The sun sensors were designed to handle high velocity dust impacts, but the risk of damage to the assembly is higher than normal during proximal orbit hazardous ring plane crossings. Therefore, the operations team developed a procedure to give the ground, rather than the on-board fault protection system, the first opportunity to diagnose and execute a contingency plan in the event of damage to the sun sensor by the impact of dust particles while crossing through Saturn's ring plane. Given the plan described in this paper, we expect a successful and exciting finale to the Cassini mission.
